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NOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHURCH AND STATE-
Shared Time: Indirect Aid to 
Parochial Schools 
For over forty years, public schools have been participating in 
shared time programs pursuant to which non-public school children 
attend public schools for instruction in one or more subjects during 
the regular school day.1 Since ninety per cent of the pupils in non-
public elementary and secondary schools are in Roman Catholic 
schools,2 shared time-or, as it is also known, dual enrollment-
raises questions of an establishment of religion in contravention of 
the provisions of the first amendment to the Constitution. To date, 
no court has faced this constitutional issue and only three state courts 
have ruled upon the validity of shared time under state constitu-
tions and statutes. Nevertheless, such questions are significant and 
are becoming increasingly so. A National Education Association sur-
vey in 1964 revealed that 280 school systems in 35 states were operat-
ing shared time programs;3 that the use of such programs has grown 
considerably in recent years is indicated by the twenty-five per cent 
increase in the use of shared time programs during the two years 
immediately preceding the survey.4 Furthermore, Title I of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 specifically suggests 
dual enrollment programs as a means by which local educational 
agencies can obtain federal assistance for non-public school children.5 
1. Wakin, Experiment in Educational Sharing, 60 REUGIOUS EDUCATION 43 (1965), 
2, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBUC WELFARE, 88TH CONG., lsr SESS., 
PROPOSED FEDERAL PROMOTION OF "SHARED-TIME" EDUCATION 1 (Comm. Print 1963). 
3. Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Study of Shared-Time Education 
of the House Committee on Education c- Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1964). These 
school systems are primarily concentrated in the midwestem states: Michigan (42), 
Ohio (36), Illinois (27), Wisconsin (25), Minnesota (13), and Indiana (11). 
4. Hearings on Shared-Time Education, supra note 3; Powell, Shared Time, 1961: 
A Turning Point?, in REuGION AND THE PuBuc ORDER 73 (Giannella ed. 1964). 
5. (a) A local educational agency may receive a basic grant or a special incentive 
grant under this subchapter for any fiscal year only upon application therefor 
approved by the appropriate state educational agency, upon its determination 
(consistent with such basic criteria as the Commissioner may establish) 
(2) that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived 
children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled 
in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for 
including special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, 
educational radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment) 
in which such children can participate • • • • 
79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le (Supp. I, 1965). (Emphasis added.) See generally 
Comment, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act-The Implications of the 




The Nature of Shared Time Programs 
The purpose of the shared time programs is to improve the edu-
cation received by children in non-public schools. This is accom-
plished by allowing those children to study courses in the public 
school which the public school may be in a better financial position 
to offer. At the same time, the parochial school is able to channel 
the funds which it would otherwise use for providing such instruc-
tion into strengthening its parochial school program. The religious 
emphasis of a parochial school education remains intact since the 
subjects which the parochial school pupil studies in the public school 
are generally those which have little ethical value content, such as 
industrial arts, home economics, science, mathematics, and foreign 
Ianguages.6 Subjects which stress values, such as English, social 
studies, fine arts, and Christian doctrine, are taught in the parochial 
school.7 Basically, the shared time programs follow one of two pat-
terns. First, junior high school pupils may study only one or two 
courses, generally industrial arts or home economics, in the public 
school. 8 Or, second, parochial school pupils from both the junior 
and senior high school level may spend approximately one-half of 
every school day in the public school.9 
In recent years, the merits of shared time programs have become 
a subject of controversy. Some critics of shared time believe that it 
will produce a fragmentation of the public school system through a 
proliferation of parochial schools.10 These critics further argue that 
the divisiveness resulting from the development of such private 
schools would be destructive of the allegiance to common traditions 
implanted by a unified public school system. Since shared time pro-
grams must be open to all non-public schools on an equal basis, a 
related fear is that such programs may encourage the formation of 
private schools whose ideologies would include such rightist or leftist 
groups as the John Birch Society or the Black Muslims.11 Although 
some increase in the number of parochial schools might be antici-
pated as a result of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
6. Wakin, supra note I, at 47. Typically, these courses also require expensive 
equipment. 
7. Ibid. 
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, DUAL ENROLLMENT IN PUBUC 
AND NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HEW]. Such a program exists in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where 4,831 children enrolled in the seventh and eighth 
grades of parochial schools studied such courses in public schools in 1964-1965. Id. at 21. 
9. Id. at 5. A shared time program of this nature was begun in 1963 in the Cherry 
Hills School District in Michigan when 180 pupils enrolled at a parochial secondary 
school attended a public school for three hours each day. Id. at 38. 
10. Pfeffer, Second Thoughts on Shared-Time, 79 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 779 (1962). 
11. Hearings on S. 370 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2898 (1965) (Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965). 
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the increase should be marginal since the parochial school would 
still have to finance the construction and operation of its educational 
facilities and comply with minimum state educational standards. 
It has also been suggested that shared time might encourage the 
establishment of racially segregated private schools, 12 but such seg-
regation could be only partially achieved since the dually enrolled 
students would still be taking some courses in the integrated public 
school. 
More significant is the fear voiced by the American Jewish Con-
gress that public school officials in shared time programs may make 
decisions which serve parochial school rather than public school 
objectives.18 The most common example of such a situation would 
be a decision to locate a new public school near a parochial school 
so as to facilitate public school attendance by parochial school pupils, 
although the needs of the public school district dictate a different 
location.14 Such dangers can be avoided by requiring that the frame 
of reference for such decisions be the promotion of primarily public, 
rather than sectarian, purposes. The opposition of the American 
Jewish Congress is also based on the fact that, in some shared time 
programs, parochial school students are segregated while studying 
in the public school, thus emphasizing rather than mitigating re-
ligious differences.15 Although such segregation may facilitate ad-
ministration and scheduling, it is not essential to the successful oper-
ation of shared time and is a defect which can easily be remedied. 
Indeed, the House and Senate debates on the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act clearly indicate that shared time programs 
under the act must avoid religious segregation.16 
The American Civil Liberties Union has also opposed shared 
time, warning that such programs may involve participation by 
sectarian officials in decisions regarding such public school matters 
as curriculum, textbooks, or the selection of teachers.17 However, 
12. Id. at 2895. 
13. Id. at 2557-60. 
14. Such a situation arose when a parochial school proposed that the West Allis-
Milwaukee School Board locate a new public school across the street from the parish 
school. The school board rejected this proposal since, in effect, the public school would 
have served as a secular annex to the parochial school. Powell, supra note 4, at 76. 
15. Hearings on S. 370, supra note 11, at 2557-60. 
16. 111 CONG. REc. 5912-13 (1965); S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965). 
See also Kelly &: La Noue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Educa• 
tion Act, in R.EUGION AND THE Ptmuc ORDER 147-48 (Giannella ed. 1965). 
17. American Civil Liberties Union, Position on Shared Time, April 4, 1965. The 
ACLU's present opposition is also based on the contention that tax money is used to 
support academic programs for children receiving their basic education in church 
schools and, therefore, shared time violates the first amendment. Originally, the 
Church-State committee of the ACLU had recommended that the ACLU not consider 
shared time unconstitutional provided that: (1) shared time is offered on a non-
discriminatory basis to students of all church-related schools; (2) control of the 
program is vested in public authorities; and (3) such programs serve public rather 
than religious objectives. American Civil Liberties Union, Proposed Policy Recom-
mendations on the Issue of Shared Time, May 29, 1964. 
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the danger, if any, arising from such integral involvement of sec-
tarian officials in public school matters could be avoided by requir-
ing that all decisions regarding these matters be made by public 
officials. Other critics suggest that shared time programs impose an 
undue administrative burden on the public school, but while there 
is undoubtedly some additional burden, public school administrators 
who have participated in these programs have generally supported 
them18 and administrative difficulties were not among the disadvan-
tages cited by public school officials in the 1964 Health, Education 
and Welfare Department (HEW) study on shared time.19 
To Roman Catholics, shared time offers some benefits to offset 
the burden of taxation for the support of public schools that their 
children might not otherwise attend, a possibility of lower parochial 
school tuition, and improved education for their children.20 How-
ever, the reaction of the Catholic community has been ambivalent 
since shared time requires several departures from the Catholic con-
cept of education.21 First, the Catholic objective of having religion 
permeate the entire curriculum22 may be frustrated when the Cath-
olic student takes courses in the public school. However, since the 
subjects which the parochial school student studies in the public 
school are typically those which lack ethical value content, the inter-
ference with religious emphasis will most likely be minimal. Second, 
shared time conflicts with the traditional Catholic view that boys 
and girls should be taught separately during adolescence.23 How-
ever, the disadvantage of departing from this tradition is surely in-
significant when compared with the greater educational opportuni-
ties afforded Catholic children through shared time programs.24 
From the perspective of the public schools, shared time programs 
may reduce Catholic opposition to public school budgets and bond 
issues by giving Catholics an interest in the public school system.25 
Moreover, study in a pluralistic environment, which contributes 
toward understanding and a reduction of prejudices among Protes-
tants, Catholics, and Jews, will be beneficial to both dually enrolled 
and public school children.26 With few exceptions, dually enrolled 
students and their parents were found by the HEW study to support 
such programs.27 
Finally, shared time programs may provide a viable compromise 
18. Wakin, supra note 1, at 46. 
19. See HEW at 7. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Wakin, supra note 1, at 44. 
22. Symposium-Shared-Time, 57 REucmus EDUCATION !i, 30 (1962). 
211. Id. at 19. 
24. See Wakin, supra note 1, at 44. 
25. Symposium, supra note 22, at 6. 
26. Id. at 12. 
27. See generally HEW. 
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to the controversy regarding public support of non-public schools.28 
Historically, public support of sectarian instruction has been pro-
hibited in the several states29 and it is unlikely that direct aid to 
parochial schools will ever be held constitutional.30 Assuming that, 
in light of their educational function, some aid to parochial schools 
is desirable, it is submitted that shared time is one vehicle for the 
rendering of such aid, which, because the public funds are restricted 
to the public schools, is not inconsistent with our historical policy. 
Constitutionality of Shared Time Under the First Amendment 
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof." Since the first amendment has 
been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment and is therefore binding upon the states,31 it is necessary 
to determine whether shared time programs constitute an establish-
ment of religion within the meaning of the first amendment. For 
this purpose, the program should be analyzed in light of the three 
interrelated approaches which the Supreme Court has articulated 
in its interpretation of the establishment clause. 
I. The "Child Benefit" Theory 
In Everson v. Board of Education,32 the Supreme Court's first 
extensive consideration of the establishment clause, the Court up-
held a state statute providing for the reimbursement of expenses 
incurred by parents in transporting their children by bus to parochial 
as well as public schools. In interpreting the establishment clause, 
the Court articulated what appeared to be a strict separationist test: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another .... No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.33 
28. Symposium, supra note 22, at 30. 
29. KAUPER, REUGION AND THE CONsrITUTION 111 (1964). 
30. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MEMORANDUM ON TIIE IMPACT OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION UPON FEDERAL Am TO EDUCATION, reprinted in 
50 GEO. L.J. 351 (1961). 
31. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
32. 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Some commentators question whether Everson is still good 
law since Mr. Justice Douglas, who was one of the five man majority in Everson, 
appears to have repudiated the Everson holding in his concurring opinion in Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962). See Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 and the First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 307 (1966). 
33. 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
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However, in disposing of the case, the Court implicitly departed 
from this absolute standard of "no aid" and rested its decision on 
the fact that, although benefit accrued incidentally to parochial 
schools, the statute could be construed as public welfare legislation 
designed to protect school children from the hazards of traffic.34 The 
Court thus relied on the "child benefit" theory, previously enunci-
ated in Cochran v. Board of Education,35 which in effect pennits the 
state to extend certain welfare aids to students attending church-re-
lated schools without violating the establishment clause so long as 
the benefit is given directly to the child and the benefits, if any, 
received by the church-related school are wholly incidental to the 
child's. "Child benefits" typically will include such services as school 
bus transportation, secular textbooks, and medical care.36 Since 
shared time promotes public welfare-education-and since the 
benefit-opportunity to attend public school classes-accrues di-
rectly to the child with the parochial school benefiting only indi-
rectly, it would appear that shared time programs could be sustained 
under the "child benefit" approach of Everson. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that shared time does di-
rectly aid religion since it releases funds which would otherwise be 
used by the parochial school to provide the instruction offered in 
the public schools and such funds can be used by the church for 
other activities, including the expansion of the parochial school sys-
tem. This benefit, however, may not be sufficiently direct to render 
shared time programs unconstitutional, since, in Everson, the Court 
specifically recognized that some of the children might not be sent 
to the parochial schools if the parents were not reimbursed for their 
childrens' bus fare.37 In effect, therefore, the Court regarded the 
tendency of the statute to increase the enrollment in parochial 
schools as insufficient to render the statute unconstitutional. 
2. Released Time Analogy 
The Supreme Court's second approach to the establishment 
clause may be found in Zorach v. Clauson.38 In Zorach, the Court up-
held a released time program pursuant to which public schools re-
leased their pupils during the school day for religious instruction in 
34, Id. at 17-18. 
35, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). In Cochran, the Court upheld a statute which provided for 
the furnishing of free textbooks to children attending both parochial and public 
schools. However, plaintiffs did not argue that the statute violated the first amend• 
ment; instead, they contended that the statute constituted a taking of private prop-
erty for a non-public purpose in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 
36. See La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation 
and Medical Care, 13 J. PuB. L. 76 (1964). 
37. 330 U.S. at 17. 
38. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
1230 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
religious centers outside the public school. 39 Despite the fact that re-
leased time has a wholly religious purpose, the Court did not find 
it violative of the establishment clause. If shared time were regarded 
as an expanded released time program, it would clearly be constitu-
tional under Zorach.40 Admittedly, there is a difference between the 
two programs: released time permits public school children to re-
ceive religious instruction in religious centers; shared time allows 
parochial school children to receive secular instruction in the pub-
lic schools.41 Nonetheless, this distinction seems to support the con-
stitutionality of shared time, since if the public schools can accom-
modate religion when the purpose is religious instruction in 
religious centers, surely they should be able to accommodate religion 
when the end is secular instruction in the public schools.42 
3. Accommodated Neutrality 
In Abington School District v. Schempp,43 the Supreme Court's 
most recent consideration of the establishment clause, state statutes 
requiring Bible readings at the beginning of the public school day 
were declared unconstitutional. Reaffirming the principle that the 
state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious be-
lievers and non-believers,44 the Court declared that, if legislation is 
to withstand the test of the establishment clause, "there must be a 
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion."45 Indeed, the Court implied that this is the 
"neutrality" which the Constitution demands. The Supreme Court 
thus articulated the criteria which have been applied in previous 
establishment clause cases: where the Court has found such com-
pelling secular purposes as the protection of school children from 
traffic hazards,46 the establishment of a uniform day of rest,47 or the 
operation of a hospital, 48 statutes which might have been suspect 
under the establishment clause were deemed constitutional; how-
ever, where no legitimate secular purpose was to be served by the 
39. Id. at 308. Previously, the Supreme Court, in Illinois ex rel. McCollom v. 
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), had held unconstitutional a program permitting 
sectarian teachers to hold weekly classes in the public schools. 
40. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REY. 578, 594 (1962). 
41. STOKES 8e PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 390 (1964). 
42. In upholding the released time program, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
when the state cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it accommodates the public service to the spiritual needs of 
the community and thus follows the best of our traditions. 343 U.S. at 313-14. 
43. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
44. Id. at 218. 
45. Id. at 222. 
46. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946). 
47 • .Braunfeld v • .Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961). 
48 • .Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
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statute, the Court generally found the statute to be violative of the 
clause and hence unconstitutional.49 Analyzing shared time programs 
in light of the Schempp approach, it is clear that such programs 
satisfy the requisite two criteria: a secular legislative purpose and 
a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion.60 As 
to the first, the purpose of shared time is to extend public school 
instruction to students in church-related schools, clearly a secular 
objective. Second, in order to satisfy the primary effect test, the state 
may not employ essentially religious means in advancing its secular 
ends, 61 but, since the means employed in shared time programs are 
the public schools, no difficulty is encountered here. 
The tenor of the Schempp opinion indicates that the neutrality 
of which the Court speaks is not a strict neutrality but rather one of 
accommodation. This conclusion is dictated in part by the Court's 
emphasis on the compulsion which exists when the state requires 
children to attend school and then subjects them to Bible readings 
supervised by the teacher-a state employee; under a strict neutrality 
test an examination of these coercive factors would not be necessary 
since the mere fact that the Bible readings were directed at religious 
rather than secular ends would be a sufficient basis for finding a 
violation of the establishment clause.62 Additional support for this 
conclusion may be drawn from Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring 
opinion in Schempp, wherein he enumerates six types of permissible 
programs in which the activity in question constitutes what may be 
deemed an establishment of religion, thus making it clear that not 
every connection between religion and the state is unconstitutional. 53 
Admittedly, several of these activities involve situations in which 
the establishment clause conflicts with the "free exercise of religion" 
clause and, therefore, it is arguable that the courts have merely recon-
ciled two seemingly conflicting constitutional provisions in favor of 
the free exercise clause. However, even assuming the validity of this 
49. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer prescribed by state Board of 
Regents recited at beginning of each school day); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 
(1961) (affirmation of faith in God required as condition of holding public office); 
Illinois ex rel. McCollom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction 
on public school premises). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), where the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a released time program which had a wholly 
religious purpose. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. See generally Moore, 
The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free 
Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 142 (1963). 
50. 374 U.S. at 222. 
51. See Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, 
in REUGION AND THE PUBUC ORDER 1, 13 (Giannella ed. 1963). 
52. See KAUPER, REUGION AND THE CONSTlTIJTION 71-79 (1964). 
53. 374 U.S. at 294-304. These six categories are: military chaplains, invocational 
prayers in legislatures, the study of the Bible in public schools, tax exemption for 
churches, religious considerations in public welfare programs, and activities, such as 
the Sunday closing laws, which although religious in origin, have ceased to have 
religious meaning. 
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argument, it is obvious that shared time also involves issues which 
relate to the free exercise of religion, particularly the educating of 
one's child in the religious beliefs of the parents.54 The Supreme 
Court recognized in Sherbert v. Verner55 that enabling an individual 
to enjoy welfare benefits without requiring him to violate his reli-
gious convictions is an accommodation which does not constitute an 
establishment of religion. Sherbert is particularly applicable to an 
analysis of shared time programs since the educational benefits of 
shared time accrue to the individual rather than to the religious 
institution, just as did the unemployment compensation benefits in 
Sherbert. 
Furthermore, a public school education is a benefit which the 
state makes available to the entire community and the benefits which 
the church receives by the attendance of Catholic children in public 
schools under shared time programs are no different than the bene-
fits it receives from such services as sanitation, police, and fire pro-
tection, which are also provided to the general public without regard 
to religious beliefs. As the Everson Court emphasized, the state can-
not exclude anyone from receiving public welfare benefits because 
of his faith.56 Since a parent has a right to educate his child in a 
parochial rather than a public school, 57 and since the state has an 
obligation to provide a public school education to all children in a 
community, it should not be an establishment of religion within 
the meaning of first amendment for the state to provide education 
to parochial school students on a part time basis under a shared time 
program. 58 Similarly, since it is not unconstitutional for a child to at-
tend a parochial school full time, it should not be unconstitutional 
for him to attend both a parochial and a public school. 
Considerations at the State Level 
Even if shared time programs do not violate the first amendment, 
they must still overcome three obstacles at the state level: the con-
stitutionality of such programs under state constitutions, the statu-
54. See Katz, Note on the Constitutionality of Shared Time, in R.EUGION AND THE 
PU11UC ORDER 85, 89 (Giannella ed. 1964). 
55. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held unconstitutional a state's denial 
of unemployment compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who, because of 
religious conviction, refused employment requiring work on Saturdays. The Court 
emphasized that in so holding it was not fostering the establishment of the Seventh 
Day Adventist church, but rather was merely reflecting neutrality. See generally KATZ, 
RELlGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963); Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies 
in Neutrality and Accommodation, in R.EuGION AND THE Puauc ORDER 1 (Giannella 
ed. 1963); Moore, supra note 49. 
56. 330 U.S. at 16. 
57. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
58. See Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress and the Schools: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 52 VA. L. R.Ev. 1395, 1453 (1966); Note, The Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 and the First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 311 (1966). 
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tory power of local school boards to create such programs, and the 
relationship of shared time to state compulsory education laws. 
First, state constitutions are often more specific than the federal 
constitution in prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for the 
support of sectarian schools.159 For example, the Constitution of New 
York provides: 
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use ... any public 
money, ... directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance ... of any 
school . . . under the control or direction of any religious denom-
ination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is 
taught .... 60 
Although statutes authorizing bus transportation or free textbooks 
to parochial school students have generally been held unconstitu-
tional under such state constitutional provisions, 61 shared time pro-
grams need not suffer the same fate. A distinction between the two 
types of programs may lie in the fact that the former aids the student 
in receiving instruction in a parochial school whereas the latter 
brings parochial school children into the public schools and therefore 
fulfills a proper state function by providing a public school education 
for all children in the community. Since the public schools are open 
to all children, it cannot be violative of the state constitutions to 
allow parochial school pupils to attend the public schools. More-
over, as the only court to face this question reasoned, shared time 
59. See Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the First 
Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 326 (1966). See generally ANTIEAU, CARROLL &: BURKE, 
RELIGION UNDER TIIE STATE CON5rITUTIONS (1965); KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CON· 
srITUTIONS (1964). There are some exceptions, such as ORE. CoNsr. art. 1, §§ 2-3, 
which has been held to be identical to the provisions of the United States Constitution. 
City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Ore. 508, 149 P.2d 972, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 770 
(1944). 
60. N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 4. The Attorney General of New York has ruled that 
shared time would violate this constitutional provision. OP. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN., July 15, 
1965. 
61. School bus statutes held unconstitutional: Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 
(Alaska 1961); Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins, 
364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 
1963); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); 
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962). Bus statutes 
held constitutional: Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Snyder 
v. Town of Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 
299 (1961); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956); Squires v. Inhabitants of 
City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 
314, 199 Atl. 628 (1938). Although a bussing statute was originally held unconstitutional 
in Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938), the statute is now valid 
in New York under an amendment to N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 4. 
Free textbook statutes held unconstitutional: Board of Educ. v. Allan, 51 Misc. 2d 
297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 
533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962). Free textbook statutes held constitutional: 
Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929); Chance v. 
Mississippi State Textbook Rating &: Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941). 
See generally Note, 32 BROOKLYN L. REv. 362 (1966). 
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does not contribute to the support of sectarian schools any more 
than does allowing sectarian students to enroll in a public high 
school upon graduation from a sectarian elementary or junior high 
school.62 
A second obstacle presented at the state level is whether the state 
statutes have delegated to the school boards the power to create 
shared time programs. For example, shared time is specifically au-
thorized by statute in Iowa,63 but it is probably prohibited in Lou-
isiana.64 Most state statutes, however, do not deal specifically with 
shared time, but rather contain provisions granting broad discretion-
ary powers to the school boards in the operation of the public school 
system.65 In construing such a statute in Morton v. Board of Educa-
tion, 66 the Illinois Appellate Court found that the Chicago School 
Board had sufficient statutory authority to sustain its creation of 
shared time programs-a result that could be reached under most 
state statutory schemes. 
Finally, a problem may be posed by state compulsory education 
laws, as interpreted by the courts. In Special District for the Educa-
tion & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler,67 the Supreme 
Court of Missouri declared that a child attending both a public and 
a private school in one day would violate the Missouri compulsory 
education law which required children "to attend regularly some 
day school, public, private, or parish."68 The court reasoned that its 
decision was dictated by the use of the singular "school," for only 
if the statute read "some day schools" would attendance at two 
schools be permitted.69 However, as the dissent vigorously argued, 
the purpose of such legislation is to insure that children receive a 
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v. Plummer, 21 Pa. Dist. 182, 186 (1911), aff'd 
sub nom. Commonwealth v. School Dist. of Altoona, 241 Pa. 224 (1913). But cf. text 
accompanying notes 36-37. 
63. !oWA CODE § 257.26 (1962). 
64. LA. REv. STAT. § 17-153 (1963) prohibits the operation of any public school in 
connection or combination with any private school. 
65. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 340.583 (1948) ("Every board shall establish and 
carry on such grades, schools and departments as it shall deem necessary or desirable''). 
But see 65 OP. Omo Au'y GEN. 10 (1965), in which the Attorney General ruled that 
local school boards lack statutory authority for the creation of shared time programs; 
such part-time attendance would require that an exception be made to the statutorily-
prescribed requirement of five hours of class each day and there was no authority for 
such an exception. 
66. 69 Ill. App. 2d 38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966). The statute involved in this case 
was ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18 (1963). 
67. 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966). The program at issue was not shared-time but 
rather a program under which parochial school children were released from part of 
their regular school day to go to buildings maintained by the school district to receive 
speech therapy. The holding, however, equally precludes the operation of shared-time 
programs. 
68. Mo. REv. STAT. § 164.010 (1959). (Emphasis added.) This statute has since been 
amended specifically to include parochial schools. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031 (1965). 
69. 408 S.W .2d at 63-64. 
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certain minimum level of education and it should be immaterial 
whether this education is received at more than one school.70 The 
Morton court adopted this approach in construing the Illinois School 
Code, which requires every child "to attend some public school ... 
the entire time it is in session."71 The Illinois Appellate court noted: 
Since the object of the compulsory attendance law is that all children 
be educated and not that they be educated in any particular manner 
or place, part-time enrollment in a public school and part-time en-
rollment in a non-public school is permitted by section 26-1 [the 
compulsory attendance law], so long as the child receives a complete 
education.72 
Such a construction is surely more enlightened and persuasive than 
the approach of the Missouri courts and it avoids the anomalous 
result of holding a parent who seeks to improve his child's educa-
tion guilty of violating the state's compulsory education laws.73 
Conclusion 
To the children who attend non-public elementary and secon-
dary schools, shared time offers an opportunity for improved educa-
tion through expanded facilities. To the children enrolled in public 
schools, shared time offers the same advantages by engendering 
Roman Catholic support for public school expenditures. Since 
shared time is effectuated within the framework of the public school, 
it is not only consistent with our basic tradition of providing a public 
education for all, but it also enables non-public school children to 
share in this heritage. In addition, shared time furthers another basic 
tradition-allowing the free exercise of one's religious beliefs 
through the education of one's children in accordance with those 
beliefs. 
70. Id. at 66-67. 
71. 69 III. App. 2d at 43-44, 216 N.E.2d at 307. 
72. Id. at 45, 216 N.E.2d at 308. 
73. The dissent in Wheeler also pointed out that, under the majority's holding, 
a parent who transfers his child to another school after moving to a different com-
munity or a parent who allows his gifted high school-age child to attend junior college 
classes would also be guilty of violating the Missouri compulsory education law. 408 
S.W.2d at 66. Furthermore, the dissent noted that violation of the compulsory educa-
tion laws is deemed a misdemeanor and, therefore, penal in nature. Ibid. 
